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Analysts widely agree that the world has entered a period of global democratic retreat. 
Quantitative indices show year-on-year declines in aggregate levels of global democracy and in 
the number of countries classified as democracies or making democratic gains. Moreover, 
concerns about democratic decay now extend beyond the young democracies of the “third wave” 
to some of the world’s most established democratic polities, including the United States.  
Instead of the authoritarian coups that were the most common mechanisms of democratic 
reversal for much of the twentieth century, today’s imperiled democracies more often face what 
has been termed democratic backsliding, democratic erosion, or “creeping authoritarianism”: the 
gradual stripping back of constitutional safeguards and piecemeal dismantling of democratic 
institutions by elected politicians, often illiberally inclined populists. Rather than overnight 
breakdown, democratic backsliding is a drawn-out death by a thousand cuts, in which power-
hungry executives slice away at fundamental institutional checks and balances in ways that 
ultimately distort pluralism and political competition.1 
While this intuitively compelling framework does much to capture the mood of steady 
decline all around us, there is a risk that the concept of democratic backsliding may become a 
counterproductive paradigm. Specifically, this analytical framework can encourage reducing 
(un)democratic developments to movement along a linear trajectory of progress, standstill, or 
regression, thereby obscuring as much as it reveals when applied to many troubled or turbulent 
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democracies. In this regard, the rise of democratic backsliding as the dominant frame for 
understanding undemocratic change is reminiscent—albeit in reverse—of the so-called transition 
paradigm famously critiqued in these pages almost two decades ago by Thomas Carothers.2 
Applications of the backsliding paradigm to the countries of East-Central Europe (ECE) 
offer a stark illustration of these parallels, as well as the pitfalls of interpretation and 
policymaking that they generate.3 There seems to be comparatively little dispute that democratic 
backsliding has been taking place in the ECE region, once seen as emblematic of democracy’s 
“third wave.” Formerly hailed as remarkable transition success stories, democracies in this 
region—countries such as Hungary and Poland —have recently drawn academic and media 
attention as the poster children of backsliding from consolidated democracy toward hybrid or 
even fully authoritarian regimes. Scrutinized more closely, developments in this region 
demonstrate both the reality and the limitations of the backsliding paradigm. In the spirit of 
Carothers’s original injunction to ask “what is happening politically,”4 we offer an alternative 
view by highlighting two intermediate patterns—“democratic careening” and tradeoffs between 
competing democratic values—that defy easy understanding in terms of linear movement along a 
continuum from democracy to autocracy. 
 
A Transition Paradigm In Reverse? 
Even when democracy was largely advancing on the ground, the possibility that 
democratization might sooner or later go into reverse has haunted the imagination of scholars.5 
But scholarly interest in democratic backsliding has exploded in the last decade, driven by 
uncertainty about the momentum of third-wave democratization. These feelings of unease are 
associated with a range of phenomena: the proliferation and durability of hybrid regimes; the 
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international assertiveness of Russia and China; the low quality of many new democracies; the 
rise of populist parties in new and established democracies; and the social and political fallout of 
a sharp global recession that few had predicted. 
Yet relying on the backsliding concept to set the global research agenda may come at a 
cost. In many ways it risks reproducing, in reverse, the intellectual constraints of the over-
optimistic transition paradigm of the 1990s, highlighted by Carothers in his celebrated (though 
controversial) critique. In his 2002 essay Carothers identified two critically flawed assumptions 
impeding understanding of a world characterized by a mix of persistent authoritarianism, hybrid 
regimes, and low-quality democracies. These were, first, that countries moving away from 
autocracy are in transition toward democracy; and, second, that there is a linear sequence of 
stages leading to or from consolidated democracy, with countries moving forward or backward 
and “options . . . all cast in terms of the speed and direction with which countries move on the 
path, not in terms of movement that does not conform with the path at all.”6 Carothers further 
argued that those under the influence of the transition paradigm tended to take it for granted that 
elections were always watershed moments; to assume that social-structural factors mattered less 
than political and institutional choices; and to neglect the importance of state building for 
democratization.  
More than just an interesting polemic from another era, Carothers’s essay serves today as 
a timely warning of the risks inherent in the nascent backsliding paradigm. The transition 
paradigm, Carothers warned, was defined by the final (desired) outcome of transition: 
consolidated liberal democracy. The backsliding paradigm similarly rests, implicitly or 
explicitly, on a fixed (feared) outcome: a hybrid (competitive or electoral authoritarian) or fully 
authoritarian regime. Its blanket application similarly narrows our analytical range. 
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Both transition and backsliding are metaphors of movement. Yet both also tend to reduce 
our view of dynamics and trajectories to three possible options: democracies can move forward, 
fall backward, or stagnate motionless in middling positions. The V-Dem Institute, for example, 
although its dataset offers an array of indicators of unparalleled richness and its affiliated 
researchers publish cutting-edge studies, frames the key issues in its 2020 annual report in the 
familiar terms of advance versus retreat along a path between autocracy and democracy.7 While 
country-level studies often contain rich accounts of fluid and open processes of (un)democratic 
change, transition or reverse transition paradigms risk flattening these trends in order to give an 
aggregate verdict of democratic improvement or deterioration. When analysts rely overly on the 
intuitive but overly schematic backsliding framework, they may find themselves missing more 
complex dynamics involving tradeoffs or non-linear movement. 
Conceiving of all democracies as potential backsliders often leads to assessing their 
political lives in narrow terms of the extent (and forms) of their backsliding. Countries can then 
only be non-backsliders, mild backsliders, or full backsliders. As Abraham Maslow famously 
wrote: “It is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a 
nail.” But even in regions widely characterized by troubled democracy, backsliding into a hybrid 
or authoritarian regime is the exception, not the rule. This leaves non-backsliding countries, 
where different patterns not captured by this framework might be in play, as a large, diverse, and 
unexplored residual category. On the ground, however, these different patterns and outcomes are 
frequently much more than sideshows to the main event. To borrow Carothers’ words,8 these 
non-linear dynamics need to “be understood as alternative directions, not way stations” on a 




Lessons from East Central Europe 
We now turn to East-Central Europe—the region of successful postcommunist 
democratizers located between core West European states, the Western Balkans, and the 
successor states of the USSR. Central and East European countries played a key role in the rise 
of both the transition paradigm and the backsliding paradigm.9 A closer look at these states can 
once again help us to refine our notions of (un)democratic change.  
During the 1990s and early 2000s, the region defied a raft of early breakdown prophecies 
to rapidly achieve apparent democratic consolidation, aided by proximity to the EU. As 
Carothers pointed out, this made East-Central Europe one of the few clear illustrations of the 
transition paradigm in real life. The idea that this region might be losing some of its democratic 
achievements to backsliding emerged just over a decade ago. When the Journal of Democracy 
posed this question to leading specialists, they highlighted a mélange of negative developments: 
populism; illiberal nationalism and radicalism; fragmented and factionalized parties; corruption 
and informal practices; and a weak civil society and public sphere. Most, however, did not detect 
a systematic threat to democracy—and some still saw grounds for optimism or argued that 
populist movements were ambiguous phenomena, channeling social frustrations and correcting 
excessive neoliberalism, that would recast but not reverse democracy.10  
Subsequent developments clarified the very real nature of the threat to democracy in 
countries such as Hungary (beginning with the victory of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party in 2010 
parliamentary elections) and Poland (following presidential- and parliamentary-election victories 
by the right-wing Law and Justice [PiS] in 2015). These developments brought the region into 
closer alignment with theoretical notions of backsliding: The experience of these two onetime 
democratic frontrunners matches the paradigm of elected populist politicians embarking on a 
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slow but sure program of executive aggrandizement only too well. In both countries, mainstream 
parties radicalized in sharply populist directions, building on and deepening existing traditions of 
social conservatism and conservative nationalism,11 and took on features reminiscent of radical 
right populists in older Western democracies. These newly radicalized parties also strove to 
claim the mantle of anticorruption, and they received an electoral boost from external crises that 
laid bare the limits of global free markets and European integration. Once securely in office with 
solid majorities, PiS and Fidesz waged the familiar war of attrition against liberal institutions and 
liberal civil society, gradually skewing political competition. In commentary on East-Central 
Europe, these prominent examples sometimes seem to shape discussions of expected (and 
feared) patterns of political change across the entire region.12  
Yet while elements observed in Hungary and Poland such as populism, illiberal social 
conservatism, and attacks on media pluralism are present elsewhere (including outside East-
Central Europe), they occur in different degrees and different combinations that—we argue—
ultimately do not amount to the same thing. On closer examination, in much of the region 
democratic backsliding in the strict sense is more conspicuous by its absence. Scholars reviewing 
comparative democracy indices identify a maximum of four or five of the EU’s eleven current 
postcommunist members as cases of democratic backsliding (or “democratic erosion”), with only 
two—Hungary and Poland—consistently categorized as backsliders.13 The countries of East-
Central Europe exhibit a range of political configurations and trajectories, many of which fit the 
Hungarian and Polish models awkwardly or not at all. Yet with democracy scores declining 
across the region, how should we understand the many apparent “non-backsliders”? Are they 
instances of robust democratic resilience, simply behind the curve, or something else entirely? 
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Some clues can be gained by considering the analytical limitations that the backsliding 
paradigm shares with the “transition paradigm.” Carothers criticized the “transition paradigm” 
for overemphasizing elections as turning points. The backsliding paradigm too is to some degree 
electorally centered. Electoral victories by democratically disloyal politicians (often illiberal 
populists) are the logical starting point for backsliding episodes. Elected governments are the 
key agents of executive aggrandizement, and some illiberal governments in backsliding states 
have enjoyed repeat electoral victories (in Hungary in 2014 and 2018; in Poland in 2015 and 
2019).  
Inverting Carothers’s critique of the transition paradigm’s electoralism, we might point 
out that the election of authoritarian politicians does not necessarily lead to backsliding, for 
example, if institutions are robust and checks and balances sufficiently entrenched. The logic of 
the backsliding paradigm would suggest that the victory of “technocratic populist” Andrej Babiš 
in the 2017 Czech parliamentary elections and the entry of the illiberal far-right Conservative 
People’s Party (EKRE) into Estonia’s new governing coalition should be classified either as 
steps down the backsliding path or—if these illiberal advances do not lead to full-on 
institutional erosion—as instances of backsliding averted. However, both options inadequately 
capture the nature of political change in these countries. The presence of a strong but less than 
dominant populist party at the heart of the political system can generate a distinct dynamic, 
which amounts to something less than backsliding but more than politics as usual. 
Conversely, concentrations of power that threaten democracy may arise by routes other 
than politicians gaining and wielding electoral majorities. In this sense, elections not only are 
insufficient on their own to trigger democratic backsliding, but also may not be a necessary 
condition of backsliding. For example, some have suggested that the rise of powerful oligarchic 
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structures or concentrations of corporate power capable of party and state capture—evident in 
weaker democratizers such as Bulgaria but also in Slovakia—can stifle and subvert competition 
and representation to such an extent as to undermine democracy. As Antoaneta Dimitrova 
pointedly observes:  
backsliding is not simply a period of bad institutional choices ushered by illiberal populists. Instead, 
the possibility should be considered that systematic interactions between governments linked to key 
economic interests, in power for several electoral terms, and large constituencies depending on these 
economic interests, have led to the emergence of a less democratic framework of governance.14 
 
Powerful elite and oligarchical networks not only plunder public resources, but stealthily gain 
control over courts, media,  parties and even civil society. Although electoral competition, 
alternation in government, and  periodic upsurges of protest may continue, at a certain point 
representation, political choice, rule of law may be so hollowed, that democracy is effectively 
negated as a regime. The conceptualization of backsliding as a primarily electoral process—one 
that is triggered by “bad people” winning watershed elections and stopped or reversed by “good 
people” winning them back—seems inadequate to capture these longer-term, slower, and more 
complex forms of democratic erosion. 
Focusing too much on elections and the short-term fortunes of illiberal politicians also 
risks aggravating the “presentist” bias inevitable in any analysis of a gradual ongoing process, 
which creates a tendency to interpret events currently in the headlines as major (un)democratic 
shifts. For example, Zuzana Čaputová’s 2019 election as Slovak president—succeeding another 
liberal independent, Andrej Kiska—was hailed as a turning point for the struggle against 
populism in Eastern Europe, with global implications for turning the populist tide. Once 
scholars have overinterpreted the positive or negative significance of one moment, they may be 
inclined to view subsequent events as equally dramatic turns in the opposite direction. Such 
tendencies drive a rollercoaster of optimism and pessimism that has often characterized 
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discussions of democracy historically,15 but may do little to illuminate how troubled 
democracies actually work.  
This problem ties in with a broader inattention to underlying conditions (“economic level, 
political history, institutional legacies, ethnic make-up, sociocultural traditions, or other 
‘structural’ features”), a shortcoming detected by Carothers in the transition paradigm and also 
evident in the backsliding paradigm.16 This is true even with regard to analyses of East-Central 
Europe, despite political culture and communist legacies having previously been go-to 
explanations for democratic difficulties and political variation in the region. Following global 
trends, the tendency has been to explain backsliding in ECE countries by invoking more general 
proximate causes such as electoral volatility, political polarization, and the rise of populist 
parties and ideologies, or exogenous shocks such as the Great Recession, the European refugee 
crisis, the Eurozone crisis, Russian-sponsored manipulation, and more recently, the covid-19 
pandemic. In such analyses, domestic social, economic, and political structures tend to remain in 
the background, or to be subsumed in discussions of the global context. In particular, the 
unexpected susceptibility of onetime democratic frontrunners such as Hungary and Poland has 
reinforced the view of backsliding as contagion—“Orbánization” driven by the spread of illiberal 
ideas; a Hungarian-inspired playbook for unscrupulous elites crafting a transition from 
democracy that can be enacted almost regardless of structural conditions.17  
 
If Not Backsliding, What? Entering the Twilight Zone 
A focus on linear movement backward or forward—with the direction determined by 
summing up a balance sheet of democratic pluses and minuses—is especially problematic for 
analyzing countries that do not move (much) in either direction or that move erratically in 
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contradictory directions. Scholars are, naturally, aware of such cases, in which states “have 
moved back and forth or hovered on the precipice” for extended periods.18 In other instances, 
democracies morph in troubling and fundamental ways without sliding (or beginning to slide) 
into hybrid, competitive authoritarian regimes. Examined through the backsliding paradigm, 
these countries—and the array of democratic difficulties they display—either are relegated to a 
loosely theorized twilight zone of “stagnant” cases, or are rendered as democratically resilient 
success stories or lucky instances of backsliding averted.19 These broad categorizations, 
however, do not necessarily give the clearest sense of what might be going on politically. As Dan 
Slater has pointedly asked, “How might we best make sense of instances when the democratic 
game changes in decisive ways even as democracy neither collapses nor more firmly 
consolidates in the process?”20 Stagnant or resilient need not mean immobile. Such 
classifications may hide patterns of change and adaptation that tell us more about (un)democratic 
development than narratives of movement along a supposed linear path. 
To counter the schematic transition paradigm, Carothers outlined two “broad political 
syndromes” that better approximated real-life patterns into which third-wave countries were 
settling. Tentatively following in his footsteps, we use examples from the ECE region to sketch 
two intermediate patterns visible today: (1) bumpy, dynamic sequences of episodic crisis and 
confrontation falling short of the clash between authoritarian-minded illiberals and 
“prodemocracy” forces envisaged in accounts of backsliding (akin to what Slater has called 
“careening”); and (2) cases marked by tradeoffs between distinct democratic values, whose 
complex dynamics defy the “all good things go together” logic that often informs thinking about 




Unsettled Politics as a Different Game in Town 
In the backsliding paradigm, the electoral success of democratically disloyal populist 
parties or leaders is seen as the first step on the path to backsliding. But in some polities where 
populist governments inclined toward bypassing constitutional restraints take office, subsequent 
developments follow a pattern that diverges from these expectations. Populist challenges to the 
liberal fundamentals of democracy can be too weak and unsystematic to push decisively in the 
direction of a hybrid regime. Such challenges may also be stymied by institutional resistance or 
pushback from opposition or civic movements, perhaps leading to defeat in sometimes skewed 
but still competitive elections. Some observers view such episodes as “near misses” that offer 
lessons in democratic resilience.22 Others, however, detect a more drawn-out pattern, a riskier 
but nevertheless democratic state of “swerves” or “endemic unsettledness” producing turbulent 
and changeable episodes of polarized mobilization and countermobilization.23 Such dynamics are 
well captured by Slater’s metaphor of democratic careening, which conveys the idea of 
movement that is not unidirectional (democratizing or backsliding) but “back and forth from side 
to side, with no clear prospect for steadying in sight.”24  
Although it may be reinforced by sociocultural and identity cleavages, careening is 
driven by many sources of polarization and by the unresolved tension between rival blocs 
making competing democratic claims. On one side is a “populist” claim to channel a democratic 
majority, typically one including previously excluded groups and concerns, whose will overrides 
institutional constraints. On the other side one finds a “liberal” claim to defend constitutionality, 
institutions, transparency, the rule of law, and the rights of minorities. The dynamics of 
careening rest on an unstable balance between the two: Both sides have (opposing) democratic 
claims of some validity, while neither has the political weight or coherency to enforce a 
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settlement along its preferred lines. This confrontation brings no quick resolution. Populist 
triumphs within this dynamic are not entry points to a new politics of democratic backsliding, 
and populist setbacks do not herald a quick return to democratic consolidation. Rather than 
marking the lead-in to a new and different political game, this struggle between opposing 
democratic claims is the game. 
Slater identifies careening in East and Southeast Asian democracies (Thailand, Taiwan, 
and Indonesia), where it takes the form of clashes between rival party-backed social movements, 
sometimes overlapping with conflict between presidents and prime ministers. But parallel 
patterns have emerged in the very different ECE context. Their most visible expressions are 
upsurges of grassroots civic protest, unaligned with any party or movement and typically 
triggered by incumbent corruption and bad governance: for instance in Bulgaria (2013, 2020), 
Romania (2012, 2017–19), Slovenia (2012–13), the Czech Republic (2019), and Slovakia (2012, 
2018). Instances of popular mobilization and civic protest are usually framed within the 
backsliding paradigm as “prodemocracy” movements of resistance against autocratically-
inclined leaders.25 In East-Central Europe, however, (anti-)corruption—which is central in the 
politics of the region—feeds both liberal claims about the crucial checking role of unelected 
institutions and civic protest movements and populist claims to be mobilizing the popular will 
against corrupt, out-of-touch elites. Moreover, as Veronika Stoyanova’s critical analysis of the 
2013 protests in Bulgaria highlights,26 citizen mobilization in this region can be shot through 
with class conflict, with demands for good governance, accountability, and the rule of law 
potentially serving a better-educated, urban, middle-class constituency while pushing questions 
of socioeconomic inclusion and egalitarian demands off the political agenda. This divergence of 
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interests has the potential to produce precisely the type of faceoff between opposing coalitions 
seen by Slater as the driver of “careening” in Southeast Asia. 
The different perspective that the careening frame offers is well illustrated by the 
seemingly divergent cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. With a “technocratic populist” 
government led by the agro-food and media magnate Andrej Babiš as prime minister and with 
left-nationalist Miloš Zeman as president, the Czech Republic might seem to be traveling along 
the familiar backsliding trajectory, albeit with backsliding taking a comparatively mild form due 
to Babiš’s limited electoral support, his lack of a consistent ideological narrative, and a strong 
grassroots pushback against his conflicts of interests and threats to democratic checks and 
balances.27 Conversely, Slovakia elected liberal independent presidents in 2014 and 2019, was 
convulsed by civic protest movements in 2018, and dislodged the long-dominant left-populist 
Smer party in 2020 parliamentary elections. It is usually seen as a regional bright spot where 
liberal forces have pushed back successfully and forced illiberalism into retreat.  
Yet looking through the lens of democratic careening offers a different, and perhaps more 
accurate, view of two cases that turn out to have a great deal in common. Considered in these 
terms, tendencies toward authoritarian populism and the opposing liberal pushback in both 
countries figure as opposed democratic claims. When mass protests arose in Slovakia following 
the 2018 murder of journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée, participants decried Prime Minister 
Robert Fico as heading a corrupt state where the rule of law had been subverted. Fico, 
meanwhile, framed himself as a besieged democrat resisting a Europe-wide threat to popular rule 
from unelected institutions and movements without an electoral mandate. Rather than pushing 
democratic politics decisively forward or backward, in both countries the “liberal” and 
“populist” camps are weaker than they seem. Even at moments when political developments 
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suddenly careen in one camp’s favor, this may simply prepare the ground for a swing back in the 
opposite direction.  
In such settings, populist advances have their limits. Despite holding the offices of 
president and prime minister, populist forces in the Czech Republic were pushed back by 
oppositional civic protest and institutional constraints (especially as Babiš’s party ANO failed to 
gain control of countervailing institutions such as the Senate). In Slovakia, even when Smer 
commanded a majority (during its stint in government from 2012 to 2016), it did not attack 
democratic institutions in a concerted way. On the other hand, when politics recoils and careens 
back in a liberal direction, grassroots protest and institutional pushback do not translate into a 
permanent reset. The new players in Slovakia’s coalition government—many of which are top-
down personalistic parties—appear vulnerable to capture by vested interests, and in some cases 
these parties are cultivating anticorruption agendas framed along populist lines. Civic protest in 
the Czech Republic has failed to give rise to a coherent liberal political movement or party, and 
existing opposition parties are fragmented; however, the Southeast Asian experience suggests 
that even if liberal and center-right forces did unite and manage to defeat Babiš, the result would 
likely be another transient stage of careening, rather than immediate substantive democratic 
renewal. 
 
Democratic Inclusion Versus Democratic Stability 
Just as apparent backsliding can conceal more complex patterns of careening, apparent 
democratic success may conceal problematic tradeoffs, for instance between democratic 
inclusion and democratic stability. The exclusion of sections of the population from full and 
meaningful democratic participation is usually seen as uncontroversially bad for democracy. It is 
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a known risk factor for democratic collapse and a contributor to poor policy making.28 Exclusion 
can come in different forms: It can be based on gender, race, ethnicity, class, or intersections 
thereof, and can be enshrined in law or established in practice. Yet forms of exclusion are not 
simply minuses to be added to the tally when calculating a country’s degree of backsliding or 
backsliding potential. In some circumstances, exclusion can function as a stabilization 
mechanism that sustains functional democratic institutions and even efficient governance by 
shielding them from potentially destabilizing (if democratically invigorating) contestation. To 
put it simply, exclusion means that there are fewer actors able to rock the boat; the entrance of 
previously excluded voices, despite its clear desirability from the point of view of an optimal 
inclusive democracy, can have destabilizing effects on existing democratic arrangements. 
Paradoxically, predictable patterns of political competition that sustain institutional and policy 
consensus may be achieved at the expense of a pluralistic political arena that allows for 
contestation, challenge, and change.  
The Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia, which have large, marginalized Russophone 
minorities making up between a quarter and a third of the national population and which display 
patterns of mutually reinforcing ethnic and social exclusion, provide strong examples of this 
mechanism at work. By most accounts and per all major democracy indices, Latvia and Estonia 
have remained very successful democratizers. Indeed, Estonia (with Slovenia) is often ranked the 
highest performer among the EU’s post-communist member states, and Latvia is not far 
behind.29 Nonetheless, their state and democracy building were led by ethnic-majority elites who 
enshrined collective advantages establishing ethnic Estonian and Latvian “titular” populations as 
the sole legitimate proprietors of the state, above and sometimes against the sizeable Russian-
speaking minorities.30 Exclusionary citizenship laws left out a sizable portion of Estonia’s and 
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Latvia’s Russian speakers, and with a steady stream of policies aimed at defending the small 
Baltic languages, language has remained a highly politicized issue and a key social cleavage that 
shapes party politics.  
Upon independence, the mass disenfranchisement of Russian speakers through 
citizenship laws minimized contestation and debate over forms of democratic transition and 
Europeanization. The resulting exclusionary democratic settlement, which limits the influence of 
the Russian-speaking minority over policy making, was further crystalized through language 
legislation and by party political dynamics that preserved the majority elite’s grip on power. In a 
context where Russian speakers were on average more working-class and left-leaning in their 
economic outlook, economic-policy discussions that cast hard-hitting neoliberal reforms as 
ethical imperatives further reduced the scope for debate, while maintaining a certain degree of 
stability and predictability.31 In Latvia, despite a volatile party system characterized by frequent 
electoral booms and busts for newcomer (often populist) parties, parties new and old always 
regroup on the Latvian side of the ethnic divide when forming governing coalitions, excluding 
the large “Russian” party Harmony. In Estonia, the minority-friendly (but Estonian-led) Center 
Party until very recently was similarly excluded from coalition-building.  
 Seen through the lens of a trade-off between inclusion and stability, Estonia and Latvia 
appear to have attained their status as regional leaders in democratization not despite, but 
because of this pattern of exclusion. Rather than endangering their democratic stability, it has 
underpinned this stability and shaped the way these democracies work by cementing majority 
elites’ control over policy making. Over the years, minorities have mobilized (particularly in 
Latvia) and have even extracted concessions, especially when backed by strong international 
pressure. However, majority elites have managed to remain “democracy’s gatekeepers,” 
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legislating on minority-sensitive issues such as language and education as well as on economic 
policy with little in the way of opposition. 
The logic of the backsliding paradigm would lead us to label Estonia and Latvia either as 
progressing (with some hiccups) toward consolidation or, in light of the success of nationalist 
far-right parties and their inclusion in governing coalitions, as facing some risk of democratic 
backsliding.32 Consideration of tradeoffs, however, reveals the limits of this view: Classifying 
Estonia and Latvia as “normal” or even consolidating democracies obscures the ways in which 
ethnic and social exclusion are embedded in their institutions, with serious implications for 
democratic quality. At the same time, classifying them as backsliders is also misleading. In both 
countries, far-right parties’ electoral success, illiberal ideas, and participation in governing 
coalitions are not new and do not in practice subvert existing democratic arrangements. While 
ethnonationalist and social exclusion are hardly good for democracy, in contexts where they are 
foundational—part of the normal rules of the game—they do not necessarily threaten stability.  
In Estonia, recent developments suggest that the long-established tradeoff between 
inclusion and stability may soon be upset by growing polarization: The Center Party now leads 
an unlikely coalition government with the “establishment” nationalist Pro Patria and the far-right 
nationalist EKRE. Even here, however, a shift to careening—with this dynamic pitting a 
rebranded, populist, and less minority-friendly Center Party against the liberal center-right 





Refreshing Our Analytical Toolkit 
The notion of democratic backsliding has coalesced into a clear concept: slow, formally 
legal descent into a hybrid regime, orchestrated by power-concentrating elected leaders in a 
relatively predictable sequence. In countries such as Hungary and Poland, this concept captures a 
disturbing reality. However, even in a region that is genuinely experiencing sharp democratic 
decline (as is the case in East-Central Europe), the tendency to read all recent (un)democratic 
developments through the lens of “backsliding” obscures crucial dynamics of tradeoffs, 
fluctuation, and sideways movement. While the picture that emerges in East-Central Europe is 
far from rosy, most states in the region do not fit the backsliding paradigm. All unhappy 
democracies are, to paraphrase Tolstoy, unhappy in their own ways. 
We need to better understand these intermediate patterns, of which we have sketched 
only two, and to do so we need to develop a more diverse conceptual toolkit. We will, in 
particular, need to think about processes of change that are more complex than progress or 
regression along a continuum of regimes. The type of patterns we have highlighted might sustain 
themselves over extended periods, but they are better seen as open-ended processes rather than 
fixed outcomes. In a country such as Estonia, stability bought at the price of social and ethnic 
exclusion may at some point morph into careening. In turn, a dynamic of careening may give 
way to one of textbook backsliding—though in a case such as the Czech Republic, a reworked 
form of technocratic populism or even a renewal that kick-starts democratic consolidation is 
equally plausible. Political scientists will, in particular, need to think hard about conceptualizing 
and identifying the tipping points that bring about such changes of state.  
Rethinking along these lines could also carry policy implications. In contexts that match 
up closely with the backsliding paradigm and its stylized division between prodemocracy and 
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authoritarian-minded actors, prioritizing civic resistance and the defense of independent 
institutions to impede would-be autocrats and boost democrats must of course be a priority. 
However, for countries whose dynamics follow ambiguous and intermediate patterns of the kind 
sketched here, a wider set of responses, going beyond the formulation of a general anti-populist 
playbook, may need to be developed to support liberal-democratic development. This is true as 
much for older, troubled democracies as for younger democracies in regions such as East-Central 
Europe. If intermediate syndromes are more than mere stepping-stones on the way to 
paradigmatic backsliding, then different strategies of democracy promotion will be needed to 
address these cases—strategies that openly recognize the uncomfortable normative and political 
choices between stability, inclusivity, and contestation that practitioners may encounter on the 
ground. Democracy’s global malaise is real, but it is also complex; if we are to have any hope of 
finding effective remedies, we must redouble our efforts at diagnosis. 
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